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   In recent years, there has been a growing concern over the impact of weak 
or ineffective states. The range of problems associated with such states is 
broad, including poverty, conflict and humanitarian crises, human rights 
violations, global security threats and weakened international systems.  
 
   Fragile states take many forms, and have been defined in various ways.  
This paper adopts a definition of ‘difficult environments’ grounded in the 
role of the state in development effectiveness.  Difficult environments are 
defined as those areas where the state is unable or unwilling to harness 
domestic and international resources effectively for poverty reduction.  
This approach is intended to complement other analytical approaches to 
fragile states, including the work of the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 
project on Countries At Risk of Instability.
1  
 
   Our definitional approach to state fragility looks specifically at the 
challenges for development and poverty reduction. It is firmly located in the 
so-called Monterrey model of development, which calls for better 
international partnerships to resolve today’s global human development 
challenges. Although looking at specific responses to difficult environments 
is beyond the scope of this paper, we assume that states outside the 
Monterrey model will require different aid instruments and approaches.  
 
   The key challenge highlighted by this definition of difficult environments is 
how to make development aid effective in places that lack basic levels of 
state capacity and commitment to poverty reduction.  
 
   By capacity we mean the core features that most strongly influence the 
state’s ability to mobilise and use resources for poverty reduction, 
including territory control and presence, the effective exercise of political 
power, basic competence in economic management and sufficient 
administrative capacity for implementation.   
 
   When assessing the willingness of a state to engage in partnerships for 
poverty reduction, we are specifically looking at two closely related 
notions.  First, an explicit political commitment to policies aimed at 
promoting human welfare should be reflected in actions and outcomes.  In 
short, political will for poverty reduction. And second, an inclusive 
approach that does not exclude particular social groups from the benefits 
of development.   
 
   Based on these two key concepts, we present an indicative typology of 
four broad types of environments: 1) the ‘Monterrey’ cases of strong 
capacity and reasonable political will, 2) the ‘weak but willing’ category 
where government capacity is an obstacle to implementing policy, 3) the 
‘strong but unresponsive’ states where state capacity is directed to 
achieving development goals, and 4) the ‘weak-weak’ governments where 
                                            
1 http://www.strategy.gov.uk/output/Page5426.asp Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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both state capacity and political will are lacking.  Real cases will be mixes 
of these stylised types, and a typology does not substitute for context-
specific political analysis.  In real cases, an awareness of political cycles 
and the linkages between political, social and economic institutions can be 
key issues for donors.  Yet a typology may help point out distinguishing 
features: different types of difficult environments will warrant different 
policies and approaches.  
 Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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DFID or UK Government policy   
5
I.  The problem of ineffective states 
 
1.  A growing interest in fragile states. In recent years, there has been 
growing concern over the impact of weak or ineffective states.  Sovereign 
states are expected to perform certain minimal functions for the security 
and well being of their citizens, as well as the smooth working of the 
international system. In simple terms, people need states to work.  States 
that fail to meet these minimal standards have been characterised as 
‘weak’, ‘fragile’, or ‘poorly performing’.
 2  More extreme cases have been 
labelled ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’.   The proliferation of labels – ranging from 
‘crisis states’ to ‘countries at risk of instability’ and ‘countries under stress’ 
– reflects the range of ways in which the core problem has been 
conceived.
3  There has been much debate over terminology and analytical 
frameworks.  Yet despite questions of definition and approach, the 
experience of people who are the victims of state failure underlines the 
urgency of the questions.  
 
2.  Impact of ineffective states. The range of problems associated with such 
states is broad (see Box 1).  In areas where states are weak, basic 
protections and services break down.  Also, the state is unable to play its 
full role in international systems, and has negative spill over effects on 
near neighbours. Some of the problems are more prevalent than others, 
and the incidence of these features in weak states has yet to be explored 
empirically.  
 
3.  Diversity of situations.  The causes and symptoms of ineffective states 
vary.  The features of weakness combine in different ways and can change 
over time, but include the following:  
 
•  State collapse: The most extreme case is one of state collapse, where 
the central state has effectively ceased to function (e.g. Somalia).     
 
•  Loss of territorial control: In less extreme cases the state may have 
only partial territorial control or deeply contested authority due to civil 
conflict (e.g. Nepal, Sudan).  Incomplete control of the territory may 
have a long history, or be a sign of a low level of state penetration 
linked to the enduring power of local or intermediary authorities (e.g. 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas).   
 
•  Low administrative capacity: States with very low administrative 
capacity, even where there is no conflict or loss of territorial control, 
may be unable to implement policies simply due to the lack of 
resources, staff, and administrative systems (e.g. Guinea-Bissau).  The 
                                            
2 The security and international relations communities have been inclined to refer to weak, 
failing, or failed states (e.g. Helman and Ratner (1992-93), Dorff (2002), Rice (2003), 
Commission on Weak and Failing States (2004)).  The international development literature 
has tended to focus on a slightly different set of states that are ‘poor performers’ in terms of 
development policy or outcomes (e.g. OECD DAC 2001, Ayres 2002).  
3 Some of the main definitions are set out in Annex 2 to this paper.  Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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challenges of administrative capacity are likely to be exacerbated in 
states where HIV/AIDS is prevalent.    
 
•  Political instability: In other states, the government’s ability to rule is 
compromised by political instability shown in frequent change in 
leaders through either constitutional or unconstitutional means, 
including coups d’etat (e.g. Central African Republic 2003).   
 
•  Neo-patrimonial politics:  In states where administrative systems 
have become dominated by informal or neo-patrimonial politics, the 
state institutions may be unable to project sufficient administrative 
capacity to carry out even basic state functions (e.g. Indonesia under 
Soeharto).  In such cases of pervasive clientelism, the political logic of 
the system diverts state authority from the stated policy goals to the 
pursuit of private wealth and power.
4    
 
•  Conflict: In states with fragile political institutions, governments may 
have difficulty managing the increasing, and often conflicting, demands 
placed upon them.
5   Where political processes break down, either 
sporadic or persistent civil conflict can arise, which can further 
undermine public institutions and political processes.  
 
•  Repressive polities: Finally, there are states that are highly effective 
in some senses, but repressive or unresponsive to their people, thus 
undermining sustainable development and sowing the seeds for future 
failure.  These different types of state weakness overlap and interact; 
yet it is important to draw analytical distinctions where possible to 
formulate more effective policy responses. 
 
4.  Multiple definitions.  It is easier to list the problems associated with state 
weakness than to produce a definitive and agreed list of ineffective states. 
There is a consensus
6 that states fall on a continuum from stronger to 
weaker performance, and that states can move quickly in and out of crisis. 
Which states are defined as weak, and the factors by which weakness is 
recognised will depend in part on the observer’s policy agenda.  Some 
states are ineffective at controlling terrorism but reasonably good at 
providing basic health care; other states maintain excellent diplomatic 
relations but are unable to contain internal civil unrest. Some definitions of 
have focused narrowly on those states affected by armed conflict, while 
other definitions include states affected by poor governance, corruption, 
and low administrative capacity.  In many cases, governments enduring 
the strains of a hostile international environment and weak capacity at 
home have struggled just to ensure state survival, so survival alone may 
be seen as an accomplishment.
7  At a time when forces of globalisation 
                                            
4 Cf. van de Walle (2001), Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1998), and Chabal and Daloz (1998).  
5 Putzel (2003).  
6 Although some authors (e.g. Bilgin & Morgan 2002) have argued that the terminology of 
state weakness or failure is unhelpful, they do not offer an analytically superior alternative.  
7 Clapham (1996). Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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and new concepts of sovereignty
8 challenge traditional notions of 
statehood, the core components of statehood can be lost in the debate 
over definitions.     
 
5.  State effectiveness lies at the heart of most definitions.  Underlying most of 
these definitions is the idea that the state should perform certain essential 
functions.   Whatever differences of scope and emphasis, observers agree 
that effective states should be able to exercise power to achieve public 
goods.
9  Thus, ‘difficult environments’, ‘fragile states’ and ‘poor 
performers’, are broadly synonymous concepts in that they refer to states 
that fail, in various ways, to provide adequate public goods to their people, 
including safety and security, public institutions, economic management, 
and basic social services such as roads and water. These are the minimal 
or core functions of the state rather than more elaborate policy roles.   
 
6.  A state’s core functions depend on two structural features.  First, that the 
government is able to exercise effective authority over its sovereign 
territory.
10   Second, that the state possesses adequate administrative 
capacity, including the personnel, skills, systems, and infrastructure to 
carry out its core functions.
11  What is at issue here is what is often 
referred to as the state’s ‘empirical statehood’ – its ability to project 
administrative and regulatory power – rather than its ‘juridical statehood’ 
as an entity recognised under international law.
12  States that are legally 
contested in their boundaries or sovereign status may nevertheless be 
able to carry out their core functions. On the other hand, there are a 
number of entities that fulfil the criteria for statehood under international 
law
13, but are unable or unwilling to deliver basic public goods. 
 
                                            
8 Sørenson (2001), International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), 
Cooper (2003).  
9 Rotberg refers to the delivery of ‘political goods’: ‘those intangible and hard to quantify 
claims that citizens once made on sovereigns and now make on states.’  (Rotberg (2004a), 2-
3). 
10 This is a restatement of the classic definition of Max Weber: the state is a political 
community that successfully claims ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory’ (Weber, 1919).   
11 Cf. Forrest (1994).  
12 Jackson (1990); see further ODI (2004b) 
13 The criteria for statehood in international law are expressed in Article 1 of the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: ‘The state as a person of 
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a 
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.’  Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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Box 1: Global and Local Impact of Fragile States 
Weak and fragile states are associated to varying degrees with the following 
impacts.  
Poverty 
•  Little or no progress in achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals 
•  Unable to deliver basic social services including water, 




•  Weak and unresponsive government can lead to civil conflict 
and inter-state wars 
•  Particularly vulnerable to humanitarian crises caused by civil 
war, food insecurity, or natural disasters  
•  Sources of chronic refugee flows placing strain on 
neighbouring states and international humanitarian response 





•  Unable to protect the basic human rights of their citizens, 
giving rise to unchecked opportunities for murder, rape, 
slavery, mutilation, extortion, theft, intimidation, and 
discrimination 





•  Providing safe havens for international terrorists and illicit 
arms trade 
•  Lacking capacity to detect, investigate, and counter terrorist 
activity  




•  Serving as bases for international criminal activity, including 
the trafficking of drugs, people, and illegal goods 




•  Depressing international trade and investment 
•  Unable to provide the regulatory framework and basic security 
required to promote economic growth 
•  Threats to global energy security where energy production or 




•  Unable to fulfil international obligations -- to protect the global 
environment, counter infectious disease, contain money 
laundering, and so on 
•  Unable to fulfil obligations to other states in protecting foreign 
nationals, maintaining effective diplomatic relations, and co-
operating to address global challenges Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
This working paper is intended to stimulate public discussion. It is not necessarily 
DFID or UK Government policy   
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7.  Unit of analysis.  Even where there is agreement on state effectiveness as 
the central question, problems of definition also arise from taking the state 
as the unit of analysis.  States such as Uganda, Colombia, and Pakistan 
have fairly strong government capacity and control over most of the 
territory, and yet do not have effective control over particular geographical 
regions. While the government in Kampala is effective in most Ugandan 
territory, and is indeed regarded as one of the ‘good performers’ by most 
development agencies, it has been unable to exert its authority in northern 
Uganda for more than a decade. Thus some areas of state weakness 
operate at the sub-state level. Similarly, the political economy of conflicts 
in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ivory Coast) in recent 
years has involved the flow of combatants, money, and arms across 
borders in a systematic way. No attempt to understand or address state 
weakness in the region can ignore the cross-border dimensions. Since the 
geographical scope of state weakness is not always coterminous with 
national borders, it makes sense to consider the regional or supra-state 
aspects of the conflict. Similar arguments have been advanced in respect 
of the South Caucasus and African Horn and African Great Lakes regions.  
 
8.  Toward a development-oriented definition.  Given the wide range of policy 
concerns, diverse state experience, and multiple definitions that are 
currently in use, the purpose of this paper is to set out an approach to 
state fragility that has a high degree of analytical utility for the challenges 
of development and poverty reduction.  It does not offer an approach that 
will suit all purposes, but it does aim to formulate a definition that is 
compatible with the objectives and activities of development agencies. In 
sum, the question asked here is: what kind of state functioning is required 
to be effective in achieving the Millennium Development Goals?  State 
functioning can be affected by a variety of different problems, and can be 
evaluated at the sub-national as well as supra-national levels.  The key 
issue is identifying those aspects of state capacity and government policy 
that are vital for basic development effectiveness. Poor developmental 
performance is thus not the defining problem, but rather it is the absence 
of a strong and/or legitimate state with which to engage. This approach is 
intended to complement rather than displace other analytical approaches 
to fragile states, including the analytical approach of the UK Prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit project on Countries At Risk of Instability.
14  
 
II.  The importance of difficult environments in achieving 
development goals 
 
9.  Difficult environments are a challenge to global development. State 
weakness tends to be correlated with poverty. Fragile states are generally 
the countries with the lowest levels of life expectancy, literacy and access 
to basic services, and with the highest levels of infant and maternal 
mortality, crime and corruption. Since many of the world’s poorest and 
most vulnerable people live in these states, they are of vital importance in 
                                            
14 http://www.strategy.gov.uk/output/Page5426.asp Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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reducing poverty. This is particularly true of Africa, where weak 
governance, conflict and HIV/AIDS are reversing the development gains of 
previous decades. But state weakness, poor governance and downward 
economic trends are also major problems in parts of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, South Asia, Central Asia and the former Soviet Union states, 
and some Arab states. There is evidence that the causal relationship 
between difficult environments and poverty is bi-directional. Stronger 
institutional and policy environments are more effective in using aid to 
generate growth,
15 whereas states with lower levels of income per capita 
are more likely to experience conflict or adverse regime change.
16    
 
10. Effective states are required to make development aid effective. Without 
effective state authority, regulation, and service delivery, the aspirations of 
economic growth and improved human development are elusive. There is 
now consensus that development aid is more effective where there are 
good policies and strong institutions.
17   At the same time, the consensus 
on a partnership approach to aid based on country-owned poverty 
reduction strategies requires a fairly high degree of state effectiveness to 
lead on policy and implement donor-supported programmes.   
 
11. The partnership model of aid effectiveness. While there is no full unanimity 
among donors on a partnership model of development, the Monterrey 
Consensus – the International Conference on Financing for Development 
held in Mexico in 2002 – went some way towards consolidating a dominant 
set of policy aspirations.
18  The partnership approach to development has 
been developed around the key themes of increased and more effective 
aid, giving developing countries a stronger voice in the international arena, 
supporting enabling policies for growth and poverty reduction, and 
strengthening country ownership alongside donor alignment. Aid allocation 
trends that favour states with strong institutional and policy environments 
have been apparent since 2000
19, and are now embodied in the World 
Bank’s Performance Based Allocation system for IDA countries as well as 
the US Millennium Challenge Account. At the same time, the focus on 
alignment and partnership has shifted aid disbursements from projects and 
programmes to sector wide approaches and more direct budget support.  
These aid instruments require the recipient state to take a stronger policy 
lead, and also to have in place capable public institutions to deliver basic 
services.   
  
12. The partnership model assumes what most difficult environments lack: 
basic levels of state capacity and commitment.  For this model and its 
mechanisms, particularly the PRS (Poverty Reduction Strategy), to be 
effective, a basic set of requirements are clearly being assumed: 
                                            
15 Dollar and Pritchett (1998).  
16 The State Failure Task Force found that countries with high infant mortality rates are 
roughly twice as likely to experience state failure as control states.   (State Failure Task Force 
(2000), vi).  
17 Collier and Dollar (2002).  
18 An early and seminal statement of the approach is set out in OECD DAC (1996).   
19 Dollar and Levin (2004). Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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a.  Authority over defined territory; 
b.  A stable political system; 
c.  Basic competence in economic management; 
d.  Some level of pro-poor commitment by the political leadership; 
e.  Sufficient administrative capacity to formulate and implement 
programmes with donor assistance  
 
Most – if not all – difficult environments have deficiencies in one or several 
of the basic requirements for a PRS approach. Countries where there is no 
political will to tackle poverty may nevertheless produce a convincing 
PRSP or similar strategy that will have very little impact on the ground. 
Conversely, a PRS will be severely hampered in countries with limited 
capacities, of the type outlined above, in terms of state control or unstable 
political institutions. 
 
13. How can donors such as DFID assist countries where the state is not able 
or willing to form development partnerships? An assessment of DFID’s 
implementation of support to poverty reduction strategies in 2003 indicates 
that, ‘in conflict countries and weak governance environments, support for 
PRS processes still accounts for less than five percent of total DFID 
assistance, and there is little optimism that this will increase in the 
immediate future
20.’ Acknowledging that a PRSP may not be the best aid 
mechanism in a difficult environment does not imply that the partnership 
principles underpinning it are inapplicable. The principle of partnership and 
country-led development remains the only promising model in the medium 
term, but it requires support for processes to build capable states with 
governments committed to poverty reduction policies. Experience has 
shown that few alternatives to partnership have worked.  Private sector 
investment tends to decline with poor governance and cannot be relied 
upon to fill financing gaps.  Conditionality policies have a very poor record, 
and are not substitute for country-owned strategies.  Humanitarian 
assistance is vital to provide immediate relief and can lay the basis for 
development efforts, but is not intended to produce – on its own - 
transformational development.  The absence of a PRS node for donor 
alignment is likely to exacerbate conflicting and multiple donor policy goals 
that have high transaction costs and which can undermine rather than 
support government effectiveness.   If it is correct to agree with the OECD 
DAC conclusion that ‘development assistance will only work where there is 
a shared commitment of all the partners’,
21 then the question of aid 
effectiveness in difficult partnerships is one of finding ways to build 
partnerships in the medium term.   
 
14. The relational aspects of partnerships.  Difficult environments are really a 
relational quandary: how should partnerships for development be formed 
over time?   As in most relationships, both partners can contribute to 
difficulties.  The policies and actions of donors may be an important factor 
                                            
20 Overseas Development Institute (2004), 24. 
21 OECD DAC (1996), 1 Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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in causing or perpetuating ineffective governance.  The problem, although 
understood here to be centred on state effectiveness, is not only located 
within a country but is indeed a relational one, including the regional 
dimension, the role of donors and aid, and the global factors such as trade, 
economic shocks, and transnational systems such as money laundering 
that support unresponsive leaders.  The donor actions and global systems 
that contribute to difficult partnerships lie beyond the scope of this paper, 
but the analysis of these factors is likely to be critical for developing 
effective donor strategies in responding to fragile states.
22    
  
III. Defining  difficult  environments for poverty reduction 
 
15. Partnership and the mobilisation of resources.   Areas where the state 
lacks the jurisdiction, authority, or capacity to exercise effective control and 
implement programmes are clearly areas where a poverty reduction 
partnership is difficult for donors and other actors.  In such areas the state 
is unable to put in place the institutions and policies required to either 
sustain a favourable regulatory framework or supervise the delivery of 
basic services.  In such areas, the state is generally too weak to extract 
domestic revenue needed for state programmes.  Nor will international aid 
be effective if it lacks the institutional strength to apply those resources to 
investment and service delivery programmes.  Similarly a government that 
is not committed to sound regulatory policies and programmes aimed at 
poverty reduction may lack the political will to use resources effectively for 
development.  Where genuine state capacity and political will are present, 
statements of policy objectives are followed with programmes that mobilise 
resources – particularly finance, staff, and partner contributions.  Where 
partnership works, resources flow to effective programmes.  If resources 
do not flow, then the partnership is not achieving its objective.   
 
16. For donors focused on furthering development through partnerships, the 
following is proposed as a working definition: difficult environments are 
those areas where the state is unable or unwilling to harness domestic and 
international resources for poverty reduction.   
 
17. Both capacity and political will are required for development effectiveness.  
Some governments possess the political will for poverty reduction but are 
hindered by low state capacity.  Other governments command state 
structures that are able to secure a high degree of social and territorial 
control, but are not primarily, committed to policies of growth and poverty 
reduction.  Moreover, many states fall somewhere in between these 
extremes.  Figure 1
* provides a visual approach to the definition, while 
stressing its dynamic nature. Although the two axes of willingness and 
                                            
22 The OECD DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships is carrying out 
analytical policy work on how donors can be more effective partners for fragile states, 
particularly in respect of aid allocation, donor co-ordination, and service delivery.  
* Adapted from Figure 1 in ‘The Politics of Pro-Poor Policy Change in Asia’, 6.  We are 
grateful to Graham Teskey for drawing this framework to our attention.  Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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capacity are here presented as equally important, this may not always be 
the case and will depend on the specific context.  
 
18. What do we mean by the state? The state is understood in a generic 
sense to be the system of social control capable of maintaining a 
monopoly of violence over a defined territory with international recognition. 
We therefore include in the concept, unless explicitly stated, the notions of 
government and regime (the specific political institutions and agents by 
which power is exercised). Strong states may be distinguished from weak 
ones according to the effective delivery of basic public goods, including 
security, social coherence, basic services, and the ability to raise and 
spend revenue.  But, although not all these functions necessarily further 
development directly, their absence will hamper any efforts to reduce 
poverty in a given territory. Additionally, the ability to achieve security, 
raise revenue, assert political autonomy and control is profoundly 
influenced by economic conditions and social mobilisation as well as by 
the legitimacy and the internal cohesion of the state itself. The definition of 
difficult environments developed here is grounded in the assessment of a 
state’s development effectiveness, particularly to engage in partnerships, 
not its coercive or cohesive power. We must, nonetheless, accept the 
conceptual and operational difficulty that entails advocating for state 
effectiveness (understood as capacity and willingness) as a necessary 
ingredient for reducing widespread poverty whilst at the same time 
accepting that it is not an independent variable and that it may not even be 
enough for sustainable development gains. Governments and state agents 
are not monolithic.  States may be strong in one ministry but weak in 
another, or strong at the centre but weak in local administration.
23. Thus, 
capacity and willingness to form partnerships for poverty reduction will 
undoubtedly vary across different parts of government. Donors tend to 
regard the central Ministry of Finance as the key partner, but other parts of 
government are also important for overall state effectiveness.  
                                            
23 Grindle (1996), 3-4 Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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19. What do we mean by harnessing resources for poverty reduction? The 
definition tries to ultimately answer the following question: as development 
partners, what do we need states to be able to do to promote growth and 
reduce poverty? In order to establish developmental partnerships, donors 
need the state to be able and willing to harness both international and 
domestic resources, that is, to control and employ them for poverty 
reduction goals.  This involves mobilising people, skills, and ideas as well 
as money.  Domestic resources include revenues levied through the state, 
as well as costs reduced through anti-corruption measures.  International 
resources refer mainly to Official Development Assistance, but can also 
include private capital, the application of ideas, as well as co-operation 
with non-state actors such as businesses and international non-
governmental organisations.  A state that mobilises resources does not 
necessarily need to channel resources through a government budget; 
mobilisation can involve creating the right regulatory frameworks to 
facilitate action by businesses, community based organisations, and 
international partners. The question of what policies or models are most 
effective for reducing poverty is not one that directly concerns us here, but 
it is worth noting that a wide range of development strategies are capable 
of producing growth and enhancing human development.
24 
                                            
24 Rodrik (2003), Unsworth (2003).   
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IV.  Understanding a state’s developmental capacity and 
willingness 
 
20. Why capacity and willingness? An important aspect of state crisis, 
particularly during transitions or transformation periods, is the failure to 
enforce any institutions, understood widely as the rules of the game that 
set incentives, opportunities and limitations for individuals and 
organisations. One of the most persistent types of state weakness occur 
because of an inappropriate match between willingness and capacity, or 
between the political conditions and a state’s exercise of transformational 
capacities
25. Effective development requires both institutional capacity to 
design and implement pro-poor policies and a degree of responsiveness of 
powerful social and political groups to alleviating poverty. By focusing on 
capacity and willingness to engage in development partnerships, we are 
arguing that these two concepts are important for poverty reduction. 
Needless to say, capacity and willingness influence each other in most 
difficult environment contexts and, although we have separated them for 
presentational and conceptual clarity, it is important to keep in mind the 
dynamics between them.  We leave out of our definitional approach all 
other aspects that may be key for state effectiveness in other dimensions, 
whilst acknowledging that they are likely to influence development 
outcomes in the long run. Poor developmental performance is thus not the 
defining problem, but rather it is the absence of a strong and/or legitimate 
state with which to engage. 
 
21. What do we mean by state capacity and willingness? Capacity and 
willingness often seem intuitively obvious to casual observers.  And they 
represent the lowest common denominator for a minimally effective state 
on many dimensions (security, law enforcement, macroeconomic 
management)
 26. Yet when used as criteria for an operational definition, 
their features become much less clear.  We set out to address this 
challenge by explaining what these two concepts mean in the context of 
difficult environments (please see Annex 1 for a detailed table of criteria).  
This stylised typology is not a substitute for context-specific analysis, so 
the performance against these core criteria should be taken as a very 
rough approximation of state effectiveness, to be corrected and refined by 
more contextual understandings.  Moreover, we recognise that a wide 




22. The concept of state capacity.  When assessing the developmental 
capacity of the state, we are looking to the core features that most strongly 
                                            
25 Khan (1999), 5 
26 The World Development Report 1997 set out the minimal functions of the state as: ‘the 
provision of pure public goods such as property rights, macroeconomic stability, control of 
infectious disease, safe water, roads, and protection of the destitute.’ (World Bank (1997), 27-
8).  The Report goes on to identify a range of ‘intermediate’ and ‘activist’ functions beyond the 
minimum core functions. 
27 Rodrik (2003).  Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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influence the state’s capacity to mobilise and use resources for poverty 
reduction. If these essential features are missing or are met to a limited 
extent, then the capacity of the state to engage with others to reduce 
poverty will be seriously affected: 
 
a.  The foundations of state authority, which guarantee a state’s 
functionality. The two key criteria are territory control and presence, 
and international sovereignty. The first includes gauging the extent to 
which a state controls its external borders and internal territory.  It also 
refers to the extent to which the state is able to provide human security 
and monopolise or regulate the legitimate use of force in a given 
territory. State authority may also be affected by juridical statehood, or 
the recognition of a territorial and political entity as a member of the 
international system. 
 
b.  The effective exercise of political power, which is required to maintain 
lines of command and control, to contain political competition within 
manageable boundaries, and to ensure there is a relationship between 
the rulers and the ruled.  Three dimensions are important: first, the 
mechanisms to distribute power, including formal and informal divisions 
power, and the existence of checks on unlimited power. Second, the 
autonomy and stability of political institutions vis-à-vis private interests 
and political or social conflict. Third, the capacity for the state to 
engage with the population.  
 
c.   Basic competence in economic management is indicated by 
institutional capacity to assess and regulate both fiscal and monetary 
policy.  A further key component is a minimal regulatory framework to 
facilitate legitimate economic activity while prohibiting economic crime.  
 
d.  The administrative capacity for implementation requires sufficient 
infrastructure, human resources, and systems to implement to the most 
basic decisions of government.  Linkages between objectives, policies, 
planning, and budgeting indicate a system for translating goals into 
resource mobilisation.  A sector-specific criterion looks at the capacity 
gaps for service delivery.  
 
23. The concept of state willingness. Although the word ‘willingness’ seems to 
somehow imply that those in power have a straightforward choice or 
decision about implementing policy goals, there may be complex social 
and political factors at work.  Political will to reduce poverty at the apex of 
government may be frustrated by local officials who lack the will to 
implement policies that run counter to their personal interests.  So too 
rulers who see the long-term value of pro-poor policy choices may be 
nevertheless be deterred by the short-term need to maintain political 
support among client groups.  Good policies often make bad politics.  In 
difficult environments, a lack of willingness may be an inability for 
governments and their agents to reconfigure their incentives because 
patrimonial or self-interested demands are more powerful. When Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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assessing the willingness of a state to engage in partnerships for poverty 
reduction, we are specifically looking at two closely related notions: 
 
a.  Commitment looks at whether or not there is an explicit political 
statement that signifies an obligation or a promise to reduce poverty. 
Having the statement or the goal is not enough, and attention needs to 
be paid to the existence of a strategy and the means and incentives to 
implement it. Indeed, service delivery may be taken as a sector-specific 
example of pro-poor commitment to human development. 
 
b.  Inclusiveness assesses whether or not the political commitment to 
development and poverty reduction is in fact for all populations and 
social groups in a country. Coming back to the example of service 
delivery, it is a key indication of willingness that government 
programmes exist. But also that they do not discriminate against 
certain groups or certain territories, even whilst giving priority to the 
poorest or those in most need. 
 
24. Why not legitimacy?  Much of the work on weak and fragile states 
emphasises that weak states are often unable to generate popular support 
among their people. Some definitions treat state legitimacy as a core 
criterion to identify state weakness or fragility. But measures of legitimacy 
are unreliable and contentious. Furthermore, legitimacy has an ambiguous 
relationship to aid effectiveness so that it is problematic to base decisions 
about aid on legitimacy. It is certainly the case that in the long run stable 
and effective states are those in which government policies and public 
institutions are able to generate public support
28. It is also true that many 
weak regimes lapse into conflict or failure due to crises of legitimacy. Yet 
weak legitimacy cannot be considered a necessary characteristic of 
difficult environments for two reasons. The first is that some regimes can 
acquire legitimacy without political inclusion or policies to support growth 
and poverty reduction.  It is possible to use rhetoric, religion, charisma, 
war, or populist policies to mobilise political support.  Despots can enjoy 
legitimacy even as the structures of the state crumble around them. The 
second problem is many commentators have equated legitimacy with 
voice and accountability in public institutions. But it is not clear that 
legitimacy actually derives from political participation in formal political 
processes. Indeed, a number of commentators have argued that there is 
often a mismatch between formal political institutions and endogenous 
concepts of legitimacy.
29 It is arguable in many neo-patrimonial states that 
it is precisely the pursuit of legitimacy that has made the state a weak 
partner in poverty reduction.  Also, the policies that can bring short-term 
legitimacy may contribute directly to long-term instability and economic 
decline. 
 
                                            
28 Lipset (1981), 64 
29 See, among others, Englebert (2000), Chabal and Daloz (1998).  Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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V.  Operational implications  
 
25. A typology for good policy responses. The definition presented here raises 
several operational implications.  Foremost among these is the need for a 
typology of difficult environments that helps in the selection of aid 
instruments. This idea will be further developed elsewhere; what follows is 
a brief discussion of the main implications that derive from the definition. It 
is by no means an exhaustive list but presents some key issues to be 
considered when formulating operational responses. The aim is to produce 
a typology that is differentiated enough to assist with good policy 
responses but does not oversimplify the specific characteristics of each 
case or ignore the dynamic aspects. Particularly important is an 
understanding of historical trajectories, including the factors that 
predispose states to institutional decline as well as the variables that 
promote recovery.  Setting up early risk assessment mechanisms should 
contribute to more integrated and effective international responses.   
 
26. A simple typology, based on Figure 1, is presented below. In simple terms, 
four broad types of states can be discerned:  
 
•  States with willingness and weak capacity may be challenged in their 
mobilisation of resources for poverty reduction due to any or several of 
the following: contestation to the state’s territory control and presence; 
lack of basic fiscal and monetary building blocks; and unstable or weak 
(but legitimate) political institutions with a commitment to poverty 
reduction. Malawi or Zambia could be seen as examples of states with 
some willingness but low capacity. The challenge here will be to build 
capacity rather than transfer resources that may not be effectively put 
to use.  
 
•  States with weak willingness and weak capacity may suffer from lack of 
international recognition or a contested territory; limited administrative 
capacity for policy development and implementation; and may be seen 
as unresponsive to the needs of certain groups (including the poor). 
Sudan, Somalia and Burma can be considered examples in point. In 
this case, sequencing issues are key, and incentives are likely to play 
an important role.  Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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•  States with willingness and stronger capacity may have strong state 
presence and territory control; some degree of competence in fiscal 
and monetary policy or a strong administrative capacity and public 
institutions that are fairly committed to development. These states are 
good partners for poverty reduction, and are likely to have PRSPs in 
place, but may have structural risk factors for state weakness that 
warrant specific attention. 
 
•  States with weak willingness and stronger capacity may have a strong 
state in terms of administrative capacity and territorial control, but one 
that is unresponsive to the needs of the poor, either because of the 
neo-patrimonial nature of state politics (as in the case of Zimbabwe) or 
because a real or perceived external threat diverts the use of resources 
for other aims that do not tackle poverty in country (as in North Korea). 
The key here may be for external actors to be realistic and to look at 
long-tem drivers of change when weighing the options for engagement. 
 
27. The importance of context and the political economy. This is an era when 
more is expected from the state than ever before. But state strength is a 
complex, multifaceted concept that involves political motivation as well as 
institutional capacity and willingness. A typology is a tool that does not 




















(commitment to poverty and 
inclusiveness) 
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(authority, economic capacity, power 
distribution and implementation capacity) 
Figure 2: Towards a policy-relevant typology 
Weak capacity, stronger 
willingness – ‘weak but 
willing’  
Stronger capacity and 
willingness – ‘Monterrey’ 
countries 
Weak capacity and 
willingness – ‘weak-weak’
Stronger capacity, weak 
willingness – ‘strong but 
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political cycles and linkages between political, social and economic 
institutions and structures can be key. To understand the effectiveness of 
a state, it is necessary to realise that a state is not merely the inevitable 
result of historical evolution, but an evolving quality that cannot be 
meaningfully assessed independent of context, particularly in terms of 
international factors and the dynamics of society-state relations. 
30 A 
separate paper will look at the international factors affecting difficult 
environments. With regards to the dynamics of society-state relations, 
knowing the informal political setting is important to understand who 
benefits from a weak or failed state.
31 As donors, we also need to 
understand that reforms may be very much part of the government’s 
programme for reasons other than real commitment to sustainability or 
change: to please donors and secure funding, or because they can be 
implemented in ways that yield financial benefits or are advantageous 
politically. Where non-state actors are stronger, or where the constitution 
and the electoral system are such that unstable multi-party coalitions are 
common, links between state and society become much more relevant, 
and the question of state capacity and policy commitment may well be 




28. The measurement challenge:  Assessing both state capacity and 
willingness is a difficult task and ultimately a question of political 
judgement on a case-by-case basis.  There are no internationally agreed 
criteria by which to measure state performance that are applied 
consistently.   Moreover, many of the existing measures (e.g. Freedom in 
the World) apply standards that assess a governments’ ability to reproduce 
particular institutional forms such as multiparty democracy rather than its 
ability to deliver on generic political and social functions.   Unfamiliar 
political processes may nevertheless be effective, and even popular.  Yet 
the basic problems of subjectivity and political partiality (judging by 
external standards) will not disappear and we need to be careful to take 
this into account. Whereas the tables in Annex 1 may provide some 
indication of the areas that might give rise to proxy measures for state 
capacity and willingness, the topic of measurement will be covered in a 
separate paper. 
    
29. The need for “good donorship”. The institutional structures and practices of 
donors, including DFID, create their own patterns of incentives and 
capacities in countries. Foreign aid, both bilateral and multilateral, has 
occasionally contributed to reinforcing the reproduction of weak states 
through the transfer of resources, the continued recognition of statehood, 
and the use of aid by recipient governments for legitimising purposes. 
Donors should be aware of potential unintended consequences of 
engaging with difficult environments. The timing of donor responses is also 
                                            
30 Chabal and Daloz (1999), 4-5 
31 Englebert has pointed out: ‘The capacity to use the weak state as an instrument of 
predation is the most crucial element of the logic of its survival and reproduction.’ Englebert 
(2003), 7 
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key: many donors and governments at large still perceive the “cost of 
neglect” as bearable by comparison to the cost of prevention, given there 
is no absolute certainty that a country will fail until it does. The lack of 
coherence between aid and other policies, notably trade, means some of 
our interventions as donors are self-defeating. How can we change these 
realities? Donors need to commit to being effective partners in turn and 
this requires better understanding and increased sensitivity to different 
contexts. The typology presented here can be considered a useful tool for 
donors to think about the challenges of supporting poverty reduction in 
diverse settings, not just in terms of the reality in recipient countries but 
also in terms of the need to adjust their own operations to country 
contexts. If we are to meet the challenge of difficult environments we need 




30. Next steps. This paper’s objective was to discuss a working definition of 
difficult environments that is both linked to the wider debate about fragile 
states but at the same time focuses the challenge on donor-recipient 
relationships for poverty reduction.  This paper has not tackled the 
important problem of how to predict, prevent, or respond to state fragility.  
Nor has it attempted to disaggregate problems arising from conflict, 
external intervention or dysfunctional political systems.  We assume that 
state effectiveness is important for growth and human development, and 
that it is also important for aid effectiveness.  Where governments are 
lacking in either capacity or political will, or both, traditional aid 
partnerships will be more difficult to sustain.  Aid effectiveness in those 
environments may depend on different donor instruments and policies.  
Discerning the most important elements of state effectiveness is the first 
step in setting out more effective donor engagement strategies. Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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Annex 1: Core Elements of  
Developmental Capacity and Willingness  
 
The following tables present some key criteria for assessing state capacity 
and willingness. They are not measurement checklists or determinants of 
causality for difficult environments. They are intended as lists of factors that 
indicate to what extent a state lacks the capacity and/or willingness to 
mobilise resources for poverty reduction. They may also serve as a first step 
towards quantitative proxy indicators for measurement. 
 
Table 1: Indicators for the developmental capacity of a state 
 
A) FOUNDATIONS OF STATE AUTHORITY 
►Territory control and 
presence 
•  Control of external borders and internal territory 
•  Monopoly over legitimate use of violence and 
coercion 
•  Provision of human security 
► International 
sovereignty 
•  Juridical statehood: recognition of an entity 
(territorial and political) as a member of the 
international system 
► Rule of law  •  Ability to assert and enforce the primacy of 
national policies, laws, and norms of social and 
political behaviour over all groups 
•  Access to justice, particularly for the poor 
B) EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL POWER 
► Formal and 
informal distribution of 
power 
•  Existence of effective checks (explicit or 
otherwise) on executive power  
► Autonomy and 
stability of political 
institutions 
•  Autonomy: public institutions not used primarily 
for private gain 
•  Stability: ability of public institutions to manage 
conflict (both at elite and wider social levels) 
► Engaging with the 
population 
•  Ability of public institutions to engage with 
population through some link of representation. 
C) COMPETENCE IN MACRO-ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
► The building blocks 
for monetary and 
fiscal policy 
•  A credible currency 
•  A central bank (or similar authority with 
competence over monetary policy) 
•  A ministry of finance (or equivalent organ with 
authority over policy and distribution of resources 
within government) 
•  A consolidated and transparent budget process 
(formulation and execution) 
•  A revenue base (budget envelope and some form 





•  Predictability in the use of productive assets for 
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D) ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION 




•  Extent to which there is human/technical capacity 
to develop and own policy at any of the following 
levels: sector, central, and regional 
► Human resources  •  Existence of a functioning civil administration with 
a minimum set of skills 
•  Incentive structure: regularity and predictability of 
government salaries, staff morale, and autonomy 
between bureaucratic institutions and informal 
power networks 
► Delivery of basic 
services at local or 
central level 
•  Capacity to oversee: existence of accountability 
links between providers and public authorities 
•  Capacity to target: information 




Table 2: Indicators for the developmental willingness of a state 
 
E) POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO POVERTY REDUCTION 
► Existence of a national 
poverty reduction goal 
•  Explicit political commitment to poverty 
reduction for all population/social groups 
•  Existence of a credible strategy for poverty 
reduction. 
► Implementation of anti-
poverty policy or programme 
•  Government expenditure allocated to 
achieve poverty reduction goal through a 
strategy 
•  Consideration of links between long-term 
poverty reduction policies and more 
immediate measures 
F) INCLUSIVENESS 
► Inclusive service delivery  •  State providing or overseeing service 
delivery that is inclusive of all groups Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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Annex 2: Review of Existing Definitions and Approaches to 
Difficult Environments 
 
There are many different approaches to defining and responding to the 
complex development situation referred to under such diverse names as 
‘weak and failing states’, ‘poor performers’, ‘low-income countries under 
stress’, ‘countries at risk of instability’, ‘fragile states’, etc. Difficult environment 
countries matter, for different reasons, to a wide range of development actors, 
including NGOs, bilateral donors and international organizations, as well as 
government agencies such as foreign and defence ministries. It is important to 
state at the outset that existing terminology, in English and in other languages, 
does not necessarily refer to states that are unresponsive to the poor. Some 
may be simply poor performers, some may be autocratic, some may be 
conflict-ridden. 
 
For clarity and brevity, the following approaches and definitions are organized 
around three broad categories, based on their central themes or assumptions: 
 
a)  Fragile, failed, or crisis states: these approaches are based on the 
assessment of a state’s strength around issues of capabilities, 
sovereignty and conflict. The USAID’s Fragile States Strategy is an 
example of this approach. 
b)  Poor performing countries: most of the international financial 
institutions focus their approach to difficult environments around how 
well a country performs in terms of development outcomes, taking into 
account the quality of governance and policy choices. The World 
Bank’s Low Income Countries Under Stress is the best-known initiative. 
c)  Difficult aid partners: in this approach the emphasis is placed on the 
poor aid relationships between donors and recipient states, due to a 
combination of: a) lack of political interest in poverty reduction, and b) 
weak state and non-state institutional capacity to implement policy. The 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was a pioneer of 
this approach. 
 
DFID’s core approach is very much in the third stream, focused around issues 
of partnership, although it is contributing to the first stream as part of the HMG 
strategy lead by the Cabinet Office’s Project on ‘Countries at Risk of 
Instability’. It is important to note that definitions and approaches inevitably 
depend on a variety of endogenous factors of those organizations trying to 
come up with them: national interests, view on sovereignty and international 
jurisdiction, stance on impartiality versus effectiveness, institutional mandates 
and incentives, tools and practices, regional scope and others. 
 




Failing states are characterized by a growing inability or unwillingness to 
assure provision of even basic services and security to their populations. 
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The US Aid Agency has recently come up with a ‘Fragile States Strategy’ that 
offers three operationally relevant definitions for failing, failed and recovering 
states. The approach to assessing state fragility focuses on a state’s 
effectiveness (the degree of administrative capacity and resources) and 
legitimacy (the degree of perceived justice or fairness in the exercise of 
power), by measuring four key dimensions: political, economic, social and 
security. Although this approach provides a dynamic explanation for state 
crisis, and points to the need for linkages between integrated sector analyses 
(in a so-called ‘Fragility Framework’) and decision-making, the emphasis 
seems to be placed on security, conflict management and state capacity 
building. Additionally, by integrating legitimacy into the assessment model, 
issues of inclusion and equity are brought to the forefront in trying to address 
causes and incentives. But a disadvantage is that effectiveness does not 
seem to be sufficiently disaggregated to understand the difference between 
ability and willingness.  
 




In many parts of the world bad governance, civil conflict, and the easy 
availability of small arms have led to a weakening of state and social 
structures. In some cases, this has brought about something close to the 
collapse of state institutions. 
 
The European Council’s Security Strategy of December 2003, titled ‘A Secure 
Europe in a Better World’, explicitly recognises state failure as a key threat to 
Europe’s and the world’s security, but offers no definition. It refers to bad 
governance, civil conflict and, in some cases, collapse of state institutions. In 
order to address this threat, the EU sees itself well positioned to respond to 
‘multi-faceted situations’ through military instruments, regional political 
solutions, economic aid and civilian crisis management. 
 
For more information: 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10881en03.pdf  
 
The Crisis States Programme 
 
Crisis states are those political, economic and social systems confronted with 
challenges with which the existing institutions and organisations are 
potentially unable to cope. 
 
The Crisis States Programme of the London School of Economics defines 
fragile or crisis states are those in which political systems and communities 
have broken down to the point of conflict. Their policy approach is to provide 
new understanding of the causes of crisis and breakdown in the developing 
world and the processes of avoiding or overcoming them, with a particular 
focus on whether processes of globalisation have precipitated or helped to 
avoid crisis and social breakdown. The main advantage is that this study 
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representation, political and social impact of liberalization, the politics of 
conflict management and democratic reform, and institutional innovations from 
bottom up. The main disadvantage is that the crisis states programme has a 
conflict focus, which implies that strong but unresponsive states may be 
ignored. Additionally, the research does not have a developmental, pro-poor 
focus. 
 
For more information see: http://www.crisisstates.com/  
 
The State Failure Task Force 
 
State failure is defined to include four types of events, each of which indicates 
severe political instability: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime 
changes, and genocides and politicides. 
 
This US-based Task Force, now called the Political Instability Task Force, is 
led by researchers in the University of Maryland and a panel of distinguished 
scholars. It defines ‘state failure’ as an instance where central state authority 
collapses for several years. This includes four types of events: revolutionary 
wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes and genocides/politicides. The 
key drivers identified are: quality of life, regime type, international influences, 
ethnic or religious composition and other additional factors such as types of 
ideology, patterns of development, number of years of a political leader. The 
task force seeks to identify the underlying or structural conditions associated 
with the occurrence of state failure, first at the global level then focusing on 
specific geographic regions and types of failure of particular interest to US 
policy makers: a) sub-Saharan Africa, b) predominantly Muslim countries, c) 
ethnic wars, d) genocides/politicides. One of the main advantages is that it 
aims to identify risks in international trade and other types of alliances that 
affect state failure, but it lacks a development focus. 
 
For more information see: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/  
 
The German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
 
States at risk are those where the three central government functions 
(security, welfare and legitimacy/the rule of law) are being seriously eroded, 
with potential consequences to other parts of the world with regard to security 
and development 
 
The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) currently has a project on ‘States 
at Risk’ based on the idea that the breakdown or failure of states poses a 
problem to other parts of the world with regard to security and development, 
and that this can have significant regional and international ramifications. The 
project draws primarily on analyses by state players and institutions, not just 
the executive in the narrow sense, but also the legislative, the justice system 
and public administration, from national right down to local level. The common 
concept underlying the project comprises four key elements: a) the distinction 
between three central government functions (security, welfare and 
legitimacy/the rule of law); b) the use of this distinction to build up a profile of Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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fragile statehood which can then be used to categorise individual cases; c) the 
development of a conceptual framework for analysing factors that can lead to 
the erosion of statehood; and d) the development of a conceptual framework 
for potential forms of external intervention.  
 
For more information see: http://www.swp-
berlin.org/projekte/projekt.php?id=2535&active=states+at+risk&lang=en  
 
B. Poor performing countries 
 
The World Bank 
 
Low-income countries under stress (LICUS) are characterized by very weak 
policies, institutions, and governance. Aid does not work well in these 
environments because governments lack the capacity or inclination to use 
finance effectively for poverty reduction. 
 
The World Bank’s LICUS initiative (Low Income Countries Under Stress) 
defines these as characterized by very weak policies, institutions, and 
governance. Aid does not work well in these environments because 
governments lack the capacity or inclination to use finance effectively for 
poverty reduction. The LICUS approach entails engaging in a dialogue with 
the government, anchoring strategies in stronger political and economic 
analysis, promoting domestic demand and capacity for positive change, 
supporting simple and feasible entry-level reforms, and exploring innovative 
mechanisms for social service delivery. There seems to be two distinct LICUS 
environments: post-conflict and non post-conflict, but there is no definitive list 
of LICUS countries. The main advantages to this approach are that it 
emphasises engaging with these countries differently and also stresses the 
importance of measurable indicators for donor decision-making. The main 
disadvantage of the Bank's LICUS classification is that the LICUS list is not 
publicly available, and the classification is based on the Bank's own Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) system. 
 
For more information see: http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/licus/  
 
Asian Development Bank 
 
Since governments in weakly-performing countries either have weak 
capacities and/or are not committed to reform, key initial conditions under 
which aid conditionality can be effective are likely to be missing. 
 
The Asian Development Bank, as other regional development banks, has 
articulated specific positions on the difficult environments agenda. There is a 
general tendency to view low-income countries as having a particular set of 
challenges that need to be addressed through a multi-pronged approach that 
includes governance (understood in many cases in a limited public sector 
reform way) alongside growth and human development. Important principles 
underpinning the ADB approach are its emphasis on the quality rather than 
quantity of assistance; the need for innovative and highly focused approaches Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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to dialogue, strategies and operations; supporting and leveraging demand for 
positive change, and a reliance on deep partnerships with donors, other 
development agencies and civil society. 
 





The United Nations Development Programme has adopted the LICUS 
definition and approach, although emphasizing outcomes in terms of human 
development indicators and MDGs. The main advantages to the UNDP 
approach are: a) it acknowledges the externalities of difficult environment 
countries in regional settings; b) it unbundles the notion of governance 
capability, c) explicitly seeks to strengthen the nexus between development 
and peace building. The disadvantage is that by focusing too much on MDGs, 
sub-national problems may receive little attention. 
 
For more information see: http://www.undp.org/eo/DER/2003/chapter6.pdf 




Poor performing countries are those with weak policies and institutions and 
where there is little chance of sustainable development. 
 
The Australian Development Agency, in its 2002 Statement to Parliament on 
the country’s Development Cooperation Programme, stresses the need for 
continued engagement with poor performing states. Such an objective is 
understood mainly in terms of poor development outcomes, although 
embedded in wider concerns about humanitarian crises and national security 
concerns in Australia’s neighbourhood. Attention is paid to the importance of 
conflict prevention and the role of service delivery with an understanding that 
political will plays a fundamental role in the improvement of the governance 
environment in such countries. 
 
For more information see: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/about/summary11.cfm  
 




Difficult partnerships where the usual DAC country-led model does not apply; 
we distinguish ‘difficult partnerships’ from cases where the partner 
government is making its best efforts but ‘performance’, in the sense of 
outcomes, is weak. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development 
Assistance Committee refers to a continuum of countries considered ‘difficult 
partnerships’ due to a combination of: a) lack of political interest in poverty Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction 
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reduction, and b) weak state and non-state institutional capacity to implement 
policy. This means the usual DAC partnership model does not work, and 
results in poor aid relationships between donors and recipient states. The 
DAC approach explains difficult partnerships as arising when development 
objectives play little role compared with prolongation of power, with the result 
that partner governments do not have credible commitment to effective 
policies and their implementation. The response needs to be focused around 
three priority areas: a) promoting pro-poor change, b) maintaining 
development activities, and c) adopting donor co-ordination and enhancing 
policy coherence. This approach is not restricted to any specific group of 
countries, and common characteristics include: a) poor governance (conflict or 
post-conflict situations, corruption, lack of transparency, human rights 
violations); b) lack of political commitment to pursue poverty reduction; c) lack 
of capacity to develop and implement policies (both nationally and 
internationally); d) poor working relationship with donors. The main advantage 
is its emphasis on partnerships and incentives for better aid. Its disadvantage 
is a lack of objectively measurable criteria. 
 
For more information see: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/53/21682588.pdf 




Difficult partnerships are characterised by a lack of commitment to good 
governance. They differ from weak governance cases, where the Government 
makes efforts and is committed, but capacity is weak and outcomes are 
limited. 
 
The European Commission in its October 2003 communication on 
‘Governance and Development’, offers a number of measures to promote 
governance under three different scenarios: effective partnerships, difficult 
partnerships, and post-conflict situations. Difficult partnerships are 
characterised by a lack of commitment to good governance, and the reasons 
to stay engaged include: solidarity, security, and aid effectiveness. The 
communication proposes some entry points for a range of difficult 
partnerships, from the most to the least difficult. The paper does not offer any 
clear criteria for the definition of these states, but makes an explicit 
differentiation between them and governments where capacity is weak and 
outcomes are limited, but where political willingness is present.  
 
For more information see:  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/dpi/cnc/doc/2003/com2003_0615en01.doc  